Stay-to-Play & Tournament Economics
Overview
Stay-to-play (STP) is the practice of requiring teams participating in a youth sports tournament to book lodging through a designated housing partner as a condition of entry. Teams that fail to comply risk disqualification, roster removal, or non-compliance fees ranging from $100 to $500 per team. STP is nearly universal at national-tier youth soccer tournaments and common across volleyball, hockey, softball, cheerleading, and basketball.
For tournament operators, STP is the single highest-margin revenue line in the event P&L. Hotel rebates flow at near-100% margin because the housing partner handles all booking logistics, billing, and customer service. For a 500-team national tournament generating 3,000+ room nights, STP can deliver $30,000—$100,000+ in pure pass-through income (MEDIUM). Combined with entry fees, concessions, gate revenue, and sponsorship, STP-equipped tournaments consistently achieve 30—50% net margins — roughly 2—3x the margin profile of club operations (see club-economics).
For families, STP adds $200—$500+ per tournament weekend to a cost structure that already includes entry fees, travel, meals, and lost wages. The policy has become a flashpoint in a broader debate about the affordability of competitive youth sports, and its legal standing is under active challenge following the landmark Varsity Brands antitrust settlement.
How Stay-to-Play Works
The Basic Mechanism
The tournament operator partners with a housing company — a specialized sports travel firm like Team Travel Source, Athlete Travel, 365 Sports Travel, Halpern Travel, or JJRP Sports Travel — or negotiates hotel blocks directly. Hotels commit a block of rooms at a group rate in exchange for guaranteed occupancy. The tournament mandates that all teams traveling from beyond a defined radius (typically 30—50 miles) book through the official portal.
Compliance is tracked by matching booking confirmations to team registrations. Typical enforcement mechanisms include:
- Roster holds: a team’s schedule is not published until hotel compliance is confirmed
- Non-compliance fees: $100—$500 per team, sometimes charged per player
- Disqualification: entire teams removed from the bracket, forfeiting entry fees
- Opt-out fees: some tournaments allow teams to buy out of the STP requirement for $100—$300 per team (effectively converting the hotel rebate into a direct charge)
Room Ratio Requirements
Most STP policies require a minimum number of room nights proportional to roster size. Common ratios:
- One room per four players per night (most common)
- One room per team per night (smaller events)
- Minimum three-night stay regardless of game schedule (common at multi-day showcases)
Teams with 20 players forced into a three-night minimum at $159/night spend $9,540 collectively — even when the game schedule might only require one overnight. That same team booking independently at $119/night for a single night would spend $2,380, a difference of $358 per family (Oklahoma Watch, March 2025).
The Commuter Exemption
Families living within the STP radius (30—50 miles from the venue) are typically exempt. Some tournaments also exempt military families traveling on official orders who must use government per-diem rates. A few allow hotel loyalty point bookings, but only at properties within the official block.
Hotel Block Economics
How Rebates Work
The tournament operator’s revenue from STP comes in two forms:
- Per-room-night rebates: $7—$10 per room per night paid by the hotel to the tournament (or its housing partner, who splits the rebate) (MEDIUM — corroborated by Oklahoma Watch reporting and multiple industry sources)
- Commission on room revenue: roughly 10% of total room revenue, split between the housing company and the tournament operator (MEDIUM)
In the Varsity Brands litigation, court records showed Varsity collected $4 million per year in hotel rebates across its cheerleading competition portfolio. In one contract, Varsity received $20 per room night; in another, 30% of the booking agent’s commission plus an additional rebate (HIGH — court records cited in Oklahoma Watch, 2025).
Scale Economics
The economics scale dramatically with tournament size:
| Tournament Scale | Est. Room Nights | Est. STP Revenue | Est. STP Margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 200-team regional | 1,200—2,000 | $12K—$30K | ~100% |
| 500-team national | 3,000—5,000 | $30K—$75K | ~100% |
| 1,000-team elite (e.g., surf-cup, jefferson-cup) | 8,000—15,000 | $80K—$200K+ | ~100% |
The near-100% margin exists because the housing company absorbs all operational cost: inventory management, booking platform, customer service, cancellation handling. The tournament operator’s only cost is maintaining the contractual relationship.
Who Captures What
The STP value chain distributes revenue across three parties:
- Hotels: fill rooms at predictable occupancy, often during shoulder periods. Willing to discount 10—20% off rack rate because guaranteed volume eliminates vacancy risk.
- Housing companies: earn commissions of 8—15% of room revenue. Companies like Team Travel Source and Athlete Travel operate as intermediaries, managing inventory across dozens of properties. Some, like JJRP Sports Travel, are vertically integrated with tournament operators.
- Tournament operators: receive per-room rebates plus a share of commissions. This is essentially free revenue layered on top of entry fees.
Revenue Model — Full Tournament P&L
STP is the highest-margin stream, but it sits within a broader revenue mix. A typical mid-tier tournament (200—400 teams) generates revenue from five sources:
| Revenue Stream | Typical Range | Gross Margin |
|---|---|---|
| Entry fees | $180K—$600K (at $900—$1,500/team) | Variable (depends on field costs) |
| STP hotel commissions | $15K—$75K | ~100% |
| Gate / parking fees | $10K—$40K | ~90% |
| Concessions | $15K—$50K | ~80% |
| Sponsorship | $5K—$100K | ~90% |
Total gross revenue for a 200-team regional tournament runs approximately $230K, with total expenses (fields, refs, trophies, insurance, staff, tech) of roughly $120K, yielding a ~48% net margin (MEDIUM — see tournament-landscape for detailed P&L).
STP contributes 15—30% of total tournament revenue while requiring essentially zero incremental cost, making it the single most important margin driver in the business.
For context on how tournament economics fit into the broader club financial picture, see club-economics. Clubs that host flagship tournaments (richmond-united + jefferson-cup, NC Fusion + ncfc-showcase) consistently produce the highest-margin independent operations in the industry.
Margin Profile
Why Tournaments Are High-Margin Businesses
Tournament operations deliver 30—50% net margins (MEDIUM) compared to 10—30% for club operations, driven by three structural advantages:
-
Low fixed costs: most tournaments rent fields rather than owning them. Municipal complexes — especially those funded by CVBs seeking tourism room nights — often discount rental rates for events that commit to STP, creating a reinforcing loop. Overland Park, Kansas built a $36 million soccer complex specifically designed to host STP tournaments, and by 2023 offered 50% field rental discounts to events guaranteeing 2,000+ room nights (Oklahoma Watch, 2025).
-
Near-zero marginal cost on key revenue lines: STP commissions, gate fees, and parking carry no meaningful cost of goods sold. Concessions run at 70—80% gross margin. Only entry fees require significant cost offset (referee fees, insurance, scheduling technology).
-
Operating leverage from team count: doubling a tournament from 200 to 400 teams does not double field costs (scheduling becomes denser, not wider) or administrative overhead. But it approximately doubles entry fee revenue and more than doubles STP revenue (larger blocks negotiate higher per-room rebates).
Margin Comparison by Revenue Stream
| Revenue Stream | Estimated Gross Margin |
|---|---|
| STP hotel commissions | ~100% |
| Gate / parking fees | ~90% |
| Concessions | ~80% |
| Sponsorship | ~90% |
| Entry fees | Variable (depends on field rental cost) |
Legal Landscape
The Varsity Brands Antitrust Settlement
The most significant legal challenge to STP came from outside soccer. Varsity Brands — the dominant cheerleading competition, camps, and apparel company backed by Bain Capital and previously by Charlesbank Capital Partners (sold to KKR for $4.75B in 2024) — settled a class-action antitrust lawsuit for a combined $126 million ($43.5M direct purchasers + $82.5M indirect purchasers) (HIGH — court records, final approval December 6, 2024).
Key facts from the litigation:
- Plaintiffs alleged Varsity and its PE owners conspired to abuse monopoly market power to inflate prices for cheer competitions, camps, and apparel — including through STP hotel mandates
- Defendants included Varsity Brands LLC, Varsity Spirit LLC, U.S. All Star Federation (USASF), founder Jeff Webb, Bain Capital, and Charlesbank Capital Partners
- The court found the case took “courage and strength of character” to litigate and called the class representatives’ dedication “a model for others” (HIGH — court order, December 6, 2024)
- Average payout per plaintiff was $8,181.66 (HIGH — settlement administrator’s final report, approved February 12, 2026)
- Internal Varsity communications described their 2018 rebranding of STP to “Stay Smart” as “putting lipstick on a pig” (HIGH — discovery documents cited in Oklahoma Watch)
Injunctive Relief — The 35% Cap
Beyond the monetary settlement, Varsity agreed to behavioral changes for five years:
- STP cap: Varsity cannot require STP at more than 35% of its cheerleading competitions — effectively barring mandatory hotel bookings at the majority of its events through 2029
- No camp-to-competition tying: athletes cannot be required to attend a Varsity camp as a prerequisite for competing in end-of-season championships
- No exclusive purchasing mandates: participation in Varsity’s Family Plan or rebate programs cannot be conditioned on exclusive purchasing arrangements
These injunctive terms represent the first judicially-enforced structural constraints on STP in any youth sport.
The Legal Theory — Tying Arrangements
STP mandates raise antitrust concerns under the legal doctrine of tying arrangements: a seller agrees to sell a desired product (tournament entry) only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a separate product (hotel room). As antitrust attorney Kent Meyers explained to Oklahoma Watch: “The person imposing the tie is in control of an extremely desirable item … and they choose to exercise their power in this extremely desirable product to force you to buy something you wouldn’t necessarily buy otherwise.”
Tying arrangements are not per se illegal. Courts evaluate:
- Market power: does the tournament operator hold sufficient dominance that teams cannot reasonably substitute another event?
- Separate products: are tournament entry and hotel lodging distinct products in the relevant market?
- Coercion: are families genuinely forced, or do meaningful alternatives exist?
- Price impact: are mandated rates above what families could find independently?
The Varsity case was strong on all four factors: Varsity controlled an overwhelming share of competitive cheerleading events, hotel rooms are clearly separate from competition entry, athletes had no viable alternatives, and rates were inflated by undisclosed rebates. Whether soccer-specific STP cases would meet the same standard depends on market concentration — a single-operator market like Las Vegas hockey (dominated by the Dallas Stars) is more vulnerable than a fragmented soccer tournament market where teams can choose among dozens of events.
Ongoing and Potential Litigation
As of May 2026:
- A fourth antitrust lawsuit against Varsity was nearing trial as of April 2026, filed by the Open Championship Series (a competing cheerleading event operator). If it proceeds, it would be the first Varsity antitrust case to reach a jury (Sportico, April 8, 2026).
- No major soccer-specific STP lawsuit has been filed or settled, but the Varsity precedent provides a clear legal roadmap for plaintiffs’ attorneys.
- The proposed Let Kids Play Act (expected mid-May 2026) would ban STP hotel mandates as part of broader federal legislation targeting PE involvement in youth sports.
State-Level Activity
Several states have considered or enacted restrictions on tournament-related consumer practices:
- Oklahoma Watch’s 2025 investigation prompted public attention in Oklahoma but no legislation as of May 2026
- No state has enacted a standalone STP ban, though the practice falls within the scope of existing consumer protection statutes in most jurisdictions
- Municipal-level responses have been mixed: some cities actively promote STP to maximize hotel tax revenue; others, like Overland Park, Kansas, have tried to create incentive-based alternatives
Sanctioning & Governance
How Sanctioning Creates the Tournament Market
Every sanctioned youth soccer tournament must be approved by a national or state sanctioning body that provides insurance coverage, referee assignment coordination, and the legal framework under which teams can compete outside their home league. The major sanctioning bodies:
| Body | Role | Tournament Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| US Club Soccer | Sanctions the majority of competitive tournaments outside MLS Next | Most independent tournaments use US Club sanctioning |
| U.S. Soccer Federation | National governing body | Oversees sanctioning architecture; delegates to members |
| USYS (US Youth Soccer) | Traditional youth soccer pyramid | Sanctions state-level and regional tournaments through 55 state associations |
| ECNL | Elite girls’ and boys’ league | Operates its own showcase circuit (24+ events annually; 1,300+ college scouts at ECNL Florida Winter alone) |
| MLS Next | Boys’ elite pathway | Operates MLS Next Fest (1,474 teams), MLS Next Cup, Generation adidas Cup |
| Girls Academy | Girls’ elite pathway | Champions Cup and showcase circuit; strategic alliance with MLS Next since December 2024 |
Sanctioning Fees and Barriers to Entry
Sanctioning is not free. Tournament operators pay:
- Per-team sanctioning fees: typically $10—$30 per team
- Insurance premiums: covered through the sanctioning body’s umbrella policy
- Administrative requirements: background checks for coaches, field safety inspections, referee certification
These costs are modest individually but create meaningful barriers to entry for new tournament operators. A first-time organizer must navigate the sanctioning application process (often 6—12 months lead time), secure insurance, and demonstrate field quality before attracting teams. Established operators with multi-year sanctioning relationships and proven track records have a structural advantage.
Dual-Sanctioning
Some tournaments carry dual sanctioning (e.g., both US Club and USYS), which broadens the eligible player pool. Dual-sanctioned events can attract teams from both systems, increasing team count and, by extension, STP revenue.
Ownership Consolidation
Who Owns the Tournaments
The U.S. youth soccer tournament market remains overwhelmingly fragmented — over 90% of sanctioned competitive events are operated by independent clubs or nonprofits (MEDIUM — see tournament-landscape). However, PE-backed platforms have moved aggressively into the highest-revenue events.
PE-Backed National Platforms
- 3step-sports (Juggernaut Capital, Ares Management, Fiume Capital): ~$40M EBITDA, 2M+ athlete participants across 9 sports and 5,000+ clubs. Acquired edp-soccer (130,000+ youth soccer players, 25+ tournaments) in December 2023. Goldman Sachs hired to explore a potential sale as of April 2026.
- pioneer-sports (founded 2023): combined Surf Soccer and Rush Soccer into 140 clubs, 30 events, and 100,000+ athletes. Operates proprietary travel platform AthleteTravel.com.
- BPEA EQT: acquired img-academy for $1.25B in 2023. Controls the Bradenton campus hosting IMG Cup, MLS Next Generation adidas Cup, and girls-academy Champions Cup Finals.
- unrivaled-sports (Josh Harris/David Blitzer, Chernin Group, DICK’S Sporting Goods): valued at $650M+. Has explicitly named soccer as an expansion target.
Independent Club-Operated (the Majority)
Most major tournaments remain club-operated: jefferson-cup by richmond-united, dallas-cup by Dallas Cup Inc. (nonprofit), target-usa-cup by the National Sports Center Foundation, wags-tournament by Women and Girls in Soccer, bethesda-premier-cup by bethesda-sc, concorde-fire-challenge-cup by Concorde Fire, and hundreds of regional events.
Independent Multi-Event Operators
A small but strategically significant group of operators run portfolios of 10—50+ events without PE backing:
- elite-tournaments (Mike Libber, West Friendship, MD): 20+ soccer tournaments, 37+ lacrosse events across MD/PA/VA
- kings-hammer (Cincinnati): Blue Chip Showcase plus 10+ events across five states
- Soccer Management Company (SMC): 50+ events in 15 states since 2013
The Platform Dynamic
When a platform acquires both a club and a tournament, it captures revenue on both sides: player tuition and tournament entry fees from its own captive teams, plus entry fees and STP revenue from visiting teams. This dynamic accelerates when the platform also owns the housing company (see Conflict of Interest Structures below).
Conflict of Interest Structures
When the Tournament and the Travel Company Share Ownership
The most scrutinized STP arrangements involve common ownership between the tournament operator and the housing company. Three documented examples:
JJRP Management / Las Vegas: Jim and Patty Rasmussen simultaneously operate LVSA (a nonprofit club with ~72 teams in mls-next and girls-academy), vegas-cup (tournament), and JJRP Sports Travel (for-profit travel/apparel company). Revenue is captured from entry fees, hotel commissions, and merchandise through a captive customer base. Parent complaints have cited “$300/night for Motel 6 quality” and “fleecing parents” on review sites (LOW — review-sourced, unverified). This vertical integration captures maximum margin but carries significant reputational and legal risk.
Dallas Stars / Stay2Play LLC: The Dallas Stars — a $2 billion NHL franchise — ran one of the strictest STP policies in youth hockey. Oklahoma Watch’s March 2025 investigation revealed that the travel company teams were required to book through, Stay2Play LLC, was owned by Stars executives: Damon Boettcher (SVP of StarCenter Facilities), his wife Cassandra, Lucas Reid (VP of amateur sports), and Brad Buckland (tournament series director). The Stars halted their STP program after the investigation and appear to have parted ways with all three executives. The team’s COO stated they plan to “bring it back” with a new third-party partner (Oklahoma Watch, 2025).
Varsity Brands / USASF: Varsity controlled a majority of board seats on the U.S. All Star Federation (USASF), the cheerleading governing body, while simultaneously operating the dominant competition circuit. This allowed Varsity to set the rules (through USASF) and capture the economic benefit (through its events and STP mandates). The antitrust settlement directly targeted this structure.
When a Platform Owns Both the League and the Tournaments
3step-sports’ acquisition of edp-soccer created a structure where the same PE-backed entity operates both a competitive league (EDP, with 130,000+ players) and 25+ tournaments. Teams playing in EDP leagues represent a semi-captive audience for EDP-operated tournaments, and tournament STP revenue flows to the same parent company that collects league fees. This is not legally challenged as of May 2026 but structurally mirrors the Varsity/USASF dynamic that drew antitrust action.
When Clubs Require Their Own Teams to Enter Their Own Tournaments
A subtler conflict arises when a club-operated tournament requires (or strongly pressures) its own teams to enter. For a 1,000-player club running a 200-team tournament, internal teams might fill 20—40 roster spots. The club collects tuition from these players year-round and then collects entry fees from their families again at tournament time. This is standard industry practice and rarely questioned, but it layers additional cost onto families who are already paying for the competitive program.
Family Cost Impact
Total Cost Per Tournament Weekend
A single competitive tournament weekend costs families substantially more than the entry fee alone:
| Cost Component | Low | Typical | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entry fee (team share, per family) | $40 | $65 | $95 |
| Hotel (STP mandated, 2—3 nights) | $200 | $400 | $600+ |
| Gas or airfare | $30 | $150 | $500 |
| Meals (family of 4, 2—3 days) | $80 | $150 | $300 |
| Total per family per event | ~$350 | ~$765 | ~$1,500+ |
The STP hotel mandate represents 40—55% of the total per-event cost for most families. Without STP, families who drive RVs, stay with relatives, use hotel loyalty points, or find cheaper alternatives can reduce their weekend spend by $200—$500.
Annual Tournament Cost for a Competitive Player
A committed ECNL, MLS Next, or Girls Academy player typically attends 4—7 tournaments per year (down from 5—7 in the pre-Development Academy era, as national league play absorbs more of the calendar). Annual tournament-related spending:
| Commitment Level | Events/Year | Est. Annual Tournament Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Moderate competitive (2—3 regional events) | 2—3 | $1,500—$3,000 |
| Serious competitive (4—5 events including 1—2 showcases) | 4—5 | $3,000—$6,000 |
| Elite pathway (5—7 events including national showcases) | 5—7 | $5,000—$10,000+ |
These figures sit on top of annual club tuition ($2,500—$6,500), uniforms ($200—$600), and private training ($0—$3,500), bringing all-in family cost for a committed competitive player to $9,000—$20,000+ per year (see club-economics for full breakdown). The Aspen Institute’s Project Play research found average family spending on a child’s primary sport rose 46% over five years to $1,016 annually through 2024 (MEDIUM — but this average includes recreational participants; competitive families spend 5—10x the average).
The Equity Dimension
STP disproportionately burdens lower-income families. Participation in youth sports among low-income families runs at 23% versus 44% for high-income families (MEDIUM — AELP factsheet, April 2026). Tournament travel costs are a primary driver of this gap: a family with two competitive children attending four STP events per year faces $6,000+ in travel costs alone, before tuition, uniforms, or training.
Major Hotel Booking Partners
The sports travel industry serving youth tournaments is dominated by a small number of specialized firms:
| Partner | Key Tournament Clients |
|---|---|
| Traveling Teams | las-vegas-mayors-cup, Nomads, City SC events |
| Athlete Travel (AthleteTravel.com) | surf-cup ecosystem / pioneer-sports events |
| On Location | PDA, img-academy, jefferson-cup |
| Team Travel Source (TTS) | edp-soccer / 3step-sports events |
| 365 Sports Travel | NC Fusion, ABYSA, Virginia United FC, Carolina Jr. Hurricanes |
| Tournament Housing Services (THS) | slsg-spring-festival, Penn Fusion, Nashville events |
| Halpern Travel | elite-tournaments |
| JJRP Sports Travel | vegas-cup, AZ Showcases |
The housing company model is itself under pressure. The Varsity settlement exposed how rebate structures can create misaligned incentives — the housing company maximizes revenue by booking rooms at the highest rate families will tolerate, not the lowest rate available. Several newer platforms, including Fastbreak Travel, are experimenting with transparent pricing models that show families both OTA (online travel agency) rates and block rates side-by-side.
Notable STP Exceptions
Not every successful tournament mandates STP:
- crossfire-challenge (Redmond, WA, 630 teams): operates without stay-to-play, demonstrating that large events can succeed without hotel mandates
- Disney has moved away from strict STP at ESPN Wide World of Sports
- Several tournaments offer “preferred hotel” lists without mandatory booking, capturing partial commission through volume discounts
- The “stay-to-save” model — offering registration discounts for families who book within the block rather than penalizing those who do not — is gaining traction as an alternative
According to the Sports Events & Tourism Association (Sports ETA), ~40% of tournament destinations required STP in 2023, down from 60% in 2021 — a significant decline potentially influenced by the Varsity litigation and parent backlash (MEDIUM — Sports ETA survey data cited in Oklahoma Watch).
STP and Las Vegas
Las Vegas occupies a unique position in STP economics:
- 150,000+ hotel rooms — unmatched nationally
- Major airport hub with affordable flights from most U.S. cities
- Year-round tournament weather (60—75F in January—March)
- Built-in tourism and entertainment appeal that makes the hotel mandate less burdensome for families (“we’re going to Vegas anyway”)
Both las-vegas-mayors-cup and players-college-showcase leverage this infrastructure. vegas-cup captures STP through the JJRP Sports Travel entity under common ownership.
The Las Vegas CVB actively courts youth sports tournaments because sports travelers generate room nights during midweek and shoulder periods that leisure tourism does not fill. This creates favorable negotiating dynamics for tournament operators: hotels are willing to offer steeper group discounts because sports visitors fill otherwise-empty inventory.
Industry Trajectory
Three Forces Shaping STP’s Future
1. Legal pressure is mounting but unevenly distributed. The Varsity settlement created binding precedent in cheerleading. The proposed Let Kids Play Act would ban STP outright if enacted. But no soccer-specific STP lawsuit has been filed, and the fragmented nature of the soccer tournament market (hundreds of independent operators, no single dominant player) makes a monopoly-based antitrust case harder to construct than in cheerleading, where Varsity controlled an overwhelming market share.
2. Parent backlash is intensifying. Investigative journalism (Oklahoma Watch, More Perfect Union documentary), social media complaints, and organized parent advocacy are creating reputational risk for operators who maintain strict STP without demonstrating genuine value. The Dallas Stars’ decision to pause their STP program — and the departure of three executives whose personal LLC operated the housing company — signals that even large organizations are sensitive to public scrutiny.
3. Alternative models are emerging. Stay-to-save (incentive-based rather than mandate-based), transparent pricing platforms, and opt-out fee structures give operators a path to preserve hotel revenue while reducing legal and reputational exposure. Tournament operators facing this choice will likely pursue one of three strategies:
- Make STP genuinely value-additive: negotiate below-market rates, offer premium convenience, provide transparent rate comparisons
- Increase transparency: publish rate comparisons, disclose commission structures, explain where rebate revenue goes
- Raise entry fees: replace STP income with higher registration costs if mandates become legally untenable
Open Questions
- Are any state attorneys general actively investigating STP practices in youth soccer specifically?
- What percentage of vegas-cup total revenue comes from JJRP Sports Travel commissions?
- What would tournament entry fees need to increase by to offset full STP margin loss? (Back-of-envelope: if STP contributes 15—30% of revenue at ~100% margin, entry fees would need to rise 20—40% to maintain the same bottom line.)
- Has the Varsity settlement affected any 3step-sports / edp-soccer STP policies?
- How will the proposed Let Kids Play Act define STP — as a blanket ban, a disclosure requirement, or a cap modeled on the Varsity 35% threshold?
- What is the actual price differential between STP block rates and independently-booked rates at major soccer tournaments? (Anecdotal evidence suggests STP rates frequently exceed OTA rates, but systematic data is lacking.)
- Will the decline in STP adoption (from 60% to 40% of destinations between 2021 and 2023) continue, or has it stabilized?